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Abstract: Many previously-nontraded services have become tradable (or are expected to 
become so) as a result of the technological advances in information technology. That has 
raised concerns about the future of U.S. jobs and workers' incomes. However, a review of the 
evidence shows that the current extent of service offshoring is very modest, not only as a 
share of GDP but also in terms of its contribution to worker displacements in the United 
States. Service offshoring is currently a minor part of the overall international economic 
competition that the United States faces. Service offshoring appears to have been relatively 
intense for IT occupations, but the employment and wage trends in those occupations still 
compare favorably to U.S. averages. While offshoring might become much more significant 
in the future, a closer look at occupation details reveals that most U.S. service jobs are not 
suitable for performing remotely from abroad, even when some significant cultural and 
institutional barriers are ignored. In addition, a range of transaction and adjustment costs slow 
offshoring growth, and it would take a long time, possibly decades, for offshoring to attain its 
potential limits. However, the available estimates regarding how fast and how far offshoring 
will grow are very uncertain. This paper's assessment is that the exposure to service 
offshoring in the United States will be limited to 10 to 20 percent of current jobs, with an 
impact that is sufficiently gradual to blend with other ongoing structural changes in the U.S. 
economy. 
                                               
*
  The analysis and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be 
interpreted as those of the Congressional Budget Office. 
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 The term offshoring is preferred over outsourcing in this paper. Although outsourcing is used more1
frequently in the literature and in the media, it generates ambiguity in some contexts (see the discussion in Section
2).
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1.  Introduction and Summary
Some services that previously had to be performed within the United States can now be performed
from offshore locations such as India, where labor costs are much lower than in the United States.
Such movement of work, called offshoring or outsourcing, is now possible for many types of
services, from computer programming to financial analysis to telemarketing.  While offshoring helps1
businesses lower costs and reduce the shortage of workers in some situations (as in the case of IT
workers at the time of the Y2K problem), it has raised concerns about its effects on employment and
wages of U.S. workers. Job losses in the manufacturing sector from international competition have
been common for many years, but service jobs, which are by far a majority of the jobs in the U.S.
economy, have also started to appear less secure from international competition.
This paper discusses several aspects of service offshoring, including estimates of its magnitude, the
factors that drive it and slow it, and how it might have affected the IT sector. The paper finds that
service offshoring currently involves a very modest dollar amount compared to U.S. GDP. In fact,
service offshoring from the United States to other countries appears to be less, at least in dollar
terms, than service offshoring from other countries to the United States. Moreover, offshoring
accounts for a very modest fraction of the economy-wide job turnover. While service offshoring is
responsible for some worker displacements, it is not a leading driver of worker displacements in the
U.S. economy, and it was not a leading reason for the slow job growth following the 2001 recession
as some commentators claim.
While the extent of offshoring appears modest relative to the U.S. economy, offshoring can be
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concentrated in some occupations, and could result in below-average growth in earnings and
employment in those occupations. The information technology (IT) sector has been suggested as an
example of a sector that was particularly hurt by service offshoring. This paper confirms that service
offshoring indeed appears to have been more intense than average for IT occupations, which have
lost many jobs in the early 2000s. But those losses were mainly due to the collapse of the IT boom
not to offshoring. Moreover, in terms of employment and wage trends between 1999 and 2004 (the
beginning and end years of the available detailed occupational data at the time of the writing of this
paper), those professions turn out to have done better than U.S. averages.
While the amount of service offshoring is modest today, it is growing rapidly, and may generate a
more noticeable economic effect in the future, but that process is expected to be slow and gradual
rather than disruptive. Most U.S. jobs cannot be performed remotely. The range of the estimates of
the share of U.S. jobs that may be exposed to competition from service offshoring is roughly 10 to
20 percent. That range ignores many of the barriers to offshoring from linguistic, cultural, and
institutional impediments, which would necessarily make the actual fraction of offshorable jobs
smaller. However, that range does not take into account the possible future automation of current
service jobs, which might make some services more suitable to offshoring and the actual fraction
larger. On the whole, estimates for the future limits of offshoring are very uncertain. 
Nevertheless, the question of what those limits are is not an urgent one — those limits are expected
to take a very long time to reach (in the order of decades). Service offshoring is emerging as another
source of gradual structural change, which modern economies always experience continuously. The
factors that slow the growth of offshoring include the difficulties related to the remote management
of workers, costs of adjusting the workforce and the business process to suit offshoring, regulatory
and institutional barriers, and the limits in the availability of workers in lower-wage countries with
the necessary language and technical skills.
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2.  Terminology
In this paper, service offshoring generally refers to the act of purchasing from abroad services that
could be produced within the United States. While that sounds straightforward, terminological issues
arise frequently in offshoring discussions. This section aims to clarify those issues.
Several times in the discussion below, a choice needs to be made as to whether a narrower or a wider
definition would fit better for the service offshoring concept. This paper tends to opt for the wider
definitions in those cases. That has two reasons. First, the available data are usually available only
for the wider concept. Second, the leading conclusion in this paper, that the amount of service
offshoring is currently modest, automatically holds for the narrower concept if it holds for the wider
definition. Instead of switching back and forth between different definitions, this paper demonstrates
that conclusion primarily for the wider concept, which keeps the discussion simple and avoids the
potential ambiguity in the summary statements.
(i)‘Outsourcing’ vs ‘offshoring’: 
Offshoring is preferred in this paper over the term outsourcing because the latter includes domestic
transactions that are not of interest, while leaving out some offshore transactions that are of primary
interest. Outsourcing means the purchase by a firm of a good or service that could be produced in-
house from another firm, which may or may not be located in the same country. For example, a U.S.
firm could be outsourcing to another firm within the United States — that would be outsourcing, but
not offshoring. Conversely, many offshore movements of work are under the roof of the same
multinational company—for example, from a U.S. firm to its subsidiary in India. Those transactions,
which are of interest to this paper as they involve movement of jobs to lower-wage countries, would
not necessarily be called outsourcing, because no party outside the firm is involved in the transaction
 As Blinder (2006) puts it, "if you vacation in Florida, you do not want the beachboy or2
the maid to be in China."
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(everything takes place within the same firm). But the term offshoring satisfactorily covers such
transactions.
(ii) Import substitutability as a criterion: 
While offshoring constitutes a type of service import, not all service imports can be counted as
offshoring. For example, it is a service import when an American tourist pays for a hotel stay while
traveling in France, but that import would not be considered offshoring because a hotel room in the
United States is not a close substitute for one in France.  That example suggests that offshoring2
should include only service imports for which reasonable substitutes are available in the United
States. In practice, that substitutability is often neither perfect nor zero, but is somewhere in between.
For example, the American traveler in France might have vacationed within the United States
instead. Nevertheless, tourism services are left out of offshoring because they are not relevant for
popular offshoring concerns. Service imports that are left out of offshoring by that criterion include
payments to other countries for usage of fiber optic cables, copyright royalties, purchases of
insurance, tourism (spending by U.S. travelers abroad, as in the above example) and education (for
example, tuition payments by U.S. students abroad). While it could be argued that there is some
substitutability between domestic and foreign counterparts for at least some of those services, they
would not be considered to have the potential to displace U.S. workers or prevent the creation of new
U.S. jobs directly.
(iii) Is it offshoring when the other country is not a low-wage one? 
The definition above does not specify whether the country that provides the offshored service is a
 That may be less of an issue in the future if BEA’s current efforts to integrate data collection for affiliated3
and unaffiliated service trade produces more comparable data for those two types of transactions.
-5-
developing or an advanced economy. Accordingly, sending work to Germany would be counted as
offshoring by that measure. This is an area where the definition above has a disadvantage, because
offshoring concerns are very often related to the competition from low-wage countries. Expensive
labor in other advanced economies is not considered a challenge to U.S. workers. Therefore, it might
have been preferable to limit the offshoring concept to cases where the service provider is a
developing country; however, it is not always possible to identify the country of the trading partner
in the data.
The country of the trading partner is identified in the data for some offshoring-related service imports
— more specifically, for services that are imported from unaffiliated firms. Those data show that
most of those imports come from advanced economies. Therefore, the extent of service offshoring
reported in this paper (which includes service imports from those advanced economies) is likely to
be significantly greater than what is relevant for the usual offshoring concerns about the challenge
to U.S. service workers from lower-wage countries.  Nevertheless, that wider definition, which is3
forced by the lack of detailed data, will not prove to be a problem, as the conclusion that the amount
of offshoring is modest holds even for that wider concept.
(iv) Offshoring with no displacements: 
Moving production to another country requires laying off workers in many cases, but not always. For
example, consider a firm that expands its back office jobs by hiring abroad rather than in the United
States — that expansion would not displace U.S. workers, but it would be a case of offshoring as the
firm substitutes production abroad for its production in the United States. The distinction between
offshoring with and without displacements is worthwhile because displacements are costly.
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Displaced workers go through a period of unemployment, and may have to accept a new job at a
lower wage than what they earned previously. However, for some other questions, tracking both
types of offshoring could be important. For example, both types of offshoring in a given profession
would affect the employment and earnings trends in that profession. Admittedly, offshoring is a term
that many would reserve for cases that involve displacements (especially when it is used in the
context of manufacturing), but this paper opts for the wider concept that does not require offshoring
to involve displacements. (An exception is the discussions in this paper regarding the data that are
directly on displacements and the movement of work abroad.)
(v) Explicit decision by a firm to offshore is not a criterion: 
If a U.S. firm (for example, a company specializing in call center operations) loses business to a
foreign firm and, consequently, has to lay off its workers in the United States, that would be taken
as a case of offshoring (consistent with the above definition), even if those layoffs are not the result
of an explicit intention by the U.S. firm to offshore jobs.
(vi) Suppose two workers abroad are now doing a service job that could be performed by one U.S.
worker. Would that offshoring be considered as affecting one job or two?
In this paper, that would count as one job. Given that this paper’s focus is on how U.S. workers are
affected, the number of affected U.S. jobs matters here more than the number of affected jobs
abroad.
(vii)‘Insourcing’ vs ‘onshoring’: 
The opposite of offshoring—the movement of work from other countries to the United States—is
 While labor costs are the primary incentive for offshoring, in the case of domestic outsourcing, leading4
sources of cost savings include the economies of scale in the provision of specialized services, and the flexibility in
work force provided by temporary-employment agencies and outside suppliers in the face of volatile demand (see
Houseman 2001, and Abraham and Taylor 1996). Those may be stronger incentives than the labor cost advantage of
offshore labor, given that domestic outsourcing appears much more extensive than offshoring (for example, in the
data presented in Amiti and Wei (2005)).
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called onshoring in this paper.  An alternative word, insourcing, is probably used more frequently
in the literature and media, but onshoring is preferred over insourcing for the same reason offshoring
is preferred over outsourcing (see section (i) above).
3.  What Drives Service Offshoring?
The leading driver of offshoring is that it creates opportunities to lower the cost of producing goods
and services, thanks to the much lower cost of labor in developing countries.  Wage differences4
between developing countries and the United States have existed for a long time, but it has become
possible to take advantage of them for production of services only in recent years, thanks to the rapid
progress of IT technologies. The dot-com boom of the late 1990s may have contributed to the
feasibility of offshoring by leading to substantial investments in fiber-optic cable installations around
the world and in other IT technologies that reduced communication costs and thereby made
offshoring of services less costly.  Those developments changed the trade-off between costs and
benefits of locating service jobs to remote locations, giving rise to offshoring.
In addition to lowering labor costs, offshoring reduces also costs in the same manner as domestic
outsourcing (which does not benefit from the lower-cost labor in other countries). It helps firms
concentrate on their main areas of expertise by enabling those firms to contract out their auxiliary
tasks to specialized firms, which are likely to be more efficient at those tasks and hence would be
 Amiti and Wei (2005) estimate that those benefits accounted for about 11 percent of U.S. productivity5
growth in 1992-2000. While they report that figure as the benefit of service offshoring, their figure appears to mix
the benefits of offshoring with those from domestic outsourcing. In their empirical work, domestic outsourcing is not
distinguished from offshoring. Moreover, service offshoring in their data consists of an annual average increase of
about 0.014 percentage points in the share of imported service inputs. That amount appears too small to account for
11 percent of U.S. productivity growth.
 Business Week (2006) gives the example of a U.S. manufacturing company whose U.S. and Indian6
engineers collaborate twenty-four/seven. That collaboration reduced not only development and design costs but also
cycle times, allowing the company to win orders it often had to miss due to engineering constraints. Those new
orders consequently allowed the firm to expand its employment of production workers in the United States. 
 Based on the data from the Census of Manufacturers, Bartel, Lach and Sicherman (2004) report that the7
ratio of purchased service inputs to value added rose from 4.25 percent in 1992 to 10.68 percent in 1997. 
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able to do them at a lower cost.  Moreover, offshoring may open up new possibilities that might not5
have been feasible before, enabling firms to improve quality, designs, processes or service, to
increase productivity (Siems (2006) and Mann (2003)), or to expand their businesses and sometimes
also their employment.  Business Week (2006) interviews producers about the particular benefits that6
their firms derive from offshoring. The producers emphasize the advantages due to greater
efficiency, better customer service, or the ability to provide a greater variety of products as the
leading benefits, rather than simply “cost savings.”
Some additional factors may have also contributed to the growth of offshoring. The increased
outward orientation of some developing countries (especially India) is sometimes cited as a potential
factor, although the concomitant rapid growth of domestic outsourcing of services suggests that
technological changes have likely been more responsible than global developments.  Another7
example of a secondary factor is that offshoring permits night shifts in the United States to be
covered by day-time workers on the other side of the globe.
4.   The Aggregate Amount of Service Offshoring
There are no comprehensive, direct data on the key measures of offshoring, such as the total dollar
 BEA’s data on employment by multinational corporations are also used in offshoring discussions,8
especially when they focus on the role of multinational corporations in offshoring. Those data are not as useful here
because much of U.S. multinationals’ offshore activity is directed to sales in markets outside the United States—only
11 percent of the total output of U.S. firms’ foreign affiliates goes to the U.S. market (Landefeld and Mataloni,
2004). This means that, when a U.S. firm increases its employment and production abroad, that is much more likely
to increase sales abroad than to move U.S. production of that firm abroad. That is supported by the empirical finding
that when a U.S. firm expands abroad, it also hires more workers in its U.S. location (Hanson, Mataloni, and
Slaughter 2003), possibly because of the increased workload in domestic headquarters related to the expansion.
However, that empirical finding has been challenged in the case of hiring in affiliates in developing countries
(Harrison and McMillan, 2006). Moreover, that finding would not reduce concerns related to offshoring by itself
because domestic expansion of the multinationals could be at the expense of their U.S. competitors, and those
competitors could be reducing their U.S. employment. Similarly, evidence of rising employment of U.S. workers by
foreign multinationals could be at the expense of greater decreases in employment by their U.S. competitors. 
Nevertheless, an interesting finding by Borga (2005) is that service imports by U.S. multinationals represent only a
small part of the parent companies’ total (domestic and international) purchases of goods and services — about 0.4
percent in 1994, declining to 0.2 percent in 2002.   
-9-
value of imports and exports associated with offshoring and onshoring, the total number of
displacements related to offshoring, or the number of jobs gained by onshoring. The available
estimates on the amount of service offshoring are usually indirect, and they do not always exactly
correspond to service offshoring, or their accuracy may be questionable. Nevertheless, those data
provide reasonably convincing clues about the amount of service offshoring for the economy as a
whole.  
The main data source on the dollar amount of service offshoring and onshoring is BEA’s
international service trade data—more specifically, the data on international trade in business,
professional, and technical (BPT) services, which is the category where imports that are associated
with service offshoring fall under.  Estimates of the number of jobs involved in service offshoring
come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as well as from academics, consultants, and interest
groups.   It is important to note that the estimates of the numbers of offshored jobs solely focus on8
displacements due to offshoring and do not consider the number of jobs gained through onshoring.
Those data and estimates suggest that:
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(i) Although both offshoring and onshoring of services have grown rapidly, the amounts of both
are small compared to the size of the U.S. economy, and they appear to be mostly between
advanced economies;
(ii) Service offshoring is responsible for only a small fraction of economy-wide displacements;
(iii) Service jobs account for a small fraction of layoffs that are associated with movement of
work abroad or import competition;
(iv) Service offshoring may well be less than service onshoring;
(v) The amount of service offshoring is too little to have made a significant contribution to the
slow growth of employment in the recovery that followed the 2001 recession (or the
recession itself). Furthermore, service offshoring is likely to have increased less than
onshoring did in those years, implying that service offshoring on net might have even made
a (small) positive contribution to employment.
4.a. Data on International Trade in Business, Professional and Technical Services
Official data on service imports and exports show that the dollar amounts of service offshoring and
onshoring are small relative to the size of the U.S. economy.  While it is not possible to determine
the number of workers involved in offshoring from its dollar amounts, those dollar amounts are
small enough to support the conclusion that the impact of service offshoring on the economy has
been very limited. Moreover, those data also suggest that U.S. offshoring activity is mostly (in dollar
terms) with advanced economies, rather than with countries with significantly lower wages (such as
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India or China).
When a U.S. company offshores a service, the payments it makes to the firm in the other country are
counted as a service import in the U.S. national accounts. While there is no category that corresponds
directly to the service offshoring concept characterized in Section 2, the business, professional and
technical services (BPT) category under service trade contains most of such imports, as explained
in detail in Appendix A. However, the BPT category also contains some service imports that would
not be considered as service offshoring, such as payments to lawyers for representation in another
country’s court, which are not close substitutes for U.S. jobs.  (Therefore, the BPT data may
overstate the magnitude of service offshoring by an unknown amount.) While that reduces the
suitability of BPT imports as a measure of service offshoring, it does not affect the main conclusion
of this section — that the amount of service offshoring is relatively small. 
Table 1 shows that BPT imports are still small relative to U.S. GDP. For example, in 2004, BPT
imports were $40.7 billion while U.S. GDP was $11.7 trillion —  more than 250 times larger.  BPT
imports increased by $2.5 billion while U.S. GDP increased by $426 billion on average over the
1999-2003 period. The small size of the changes in exports and imports of BPT services relative to
the change in GDP make service offshoring seem unlikely to be a significant contributor to
employment changes in recent years. 
Both BPT exports and imports amounts have grown much more rapidly than total U.S. exports and
imports. In the 1997-2004 period, BPT exports grew 7.1 percent per year, faster than the total export
growth rate of 3.0 percent.  BPT imports grew at 10.0 percent per year, faster than the total import
growth rate of 7.9 percent. However, because BPT imports remain much smaller than BPT exports,
net BPT exports increased in most years. The United States was a net exporter of BPT services and
those net exports grew over time.
 Only imports from unaffiliated parties are reported by country of origin. According to GAO (2005), the9
BEA does not believe that firms report the country distribution of their service imports from affiliated parties reliably
by type of service.
 Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004) write that India is the largest destination for the white-collar shifts, with10
almost half of all shifts headed there in the first quarter of 2004 (p. 73). Separately, Gartner Inc. estimates that India
commands $2 billion of the $3 billion global offshore BPO market, according to a CNN/Money article ("Is India's
Outsourcing Honeymoon Over?" August 24, 2005, by Parija Bhatnagar). 
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<< Table 1 around here >>
However, the stronger growth in BPT imports than in exports in the 1997-2004 period should not
be taken as a sign that offshoring will continue to grow faster than onshoring indefinitely. The faster
BPT import growth likely reflects relatively faster GDP growth in the United States than in its
trading partners and the strength of the dollar — total U.S. export growth was also slower than total
U.S. import growth, and by a much greater margin.
The BEA also provides some (limited) detail on the country of origin of BPT imports, and those data
suggest that only a small fraction of BPT imports are from India,  the leading country of counterparty9
in offshoring transactions.  India is the primary destination for offshore movement of work because10
of its labor cost advantage and the English skills of its labor force. Of the reported $10.96 billion
total unaffiliated BPT imports in 2003, only $0.42 billion was from India. Most of those imports
came from other advanced economies. Those suggest that service offshoring to lower-wage countries
may be much smaller than what is suggested by total BPT imports.
BEA’s coverage of importers in its surveys may be incomplete, although the balance of evidence
suggests that the missing importers are not likely to be important enough to alter any of the
conclusions in this paper. The issue of missing importers became an issue in offshoring discussions
 According to the comment from the Department of Commerce, also included in the GAO (2005) report.11
 As noted, conceptual and methodological differences account for the majority of the discrepancy between12
the U.S. and Indian statistics. However, those still leave a large residual unexplained discrepancy (possibly 150
percent of reported BPT imports). That residual could still be due to the other conceptual and methodological
differences that were not quantified in the GAO report, but they could also be a result of true discrepancy. 
Nevertheless, even if all of that residual discrepancy is due to BEA’s understatement and the reported BPT imports
need to be multiplied by 2.5 to adjust for that, the conclusion that service offshoring has been modest relative to the
U.S. economy would not change. 
 In response to the "increasing interest in the impact on the U.S. economy of offshoring and outsourcing13
of work, ... the Mass Layoff Statistics program ... was determined [by the BLS] to be an appropriate vehicle for
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because of a large discrepancy between the U.S. and Indian statistics regarding the amount of service
imports from India—Indian estimates are several times larger.  Nevertheless, a recent report by GAO
(2005) shows that much of the discrepancy comes from the unorthodox conceptual or
methodological approaches adopted in the Indian statistics (see Appendix A).  It is not known
precisely how much discrepancy those conceptual and methodological differences cause, but they
are significant and could account for most (and possibly all) of the discrepancy.  A discussion of this
topic in the FAQ section of BEA’s website explains this as follows: “Depending upon how one
adjusts for important definitional differences, the gap between the U.S. and Indian estimates either
entirely disappears or is substantially reduced.” The GAO report also makes an attempt to identify
possible undercounting in the BEA statistics, and finds that BEA’s surveys leave out some importers
who should have been included in BEA’s list of surveyed firms.  However, BEA’s further work on
those missing importers revealed no substantial imports of services that were not already being
reported by BEA.  Furthermore, only a very large amount of undercounting would make a difference11
in the conclusions of this section, which appears to be unlikely.  12
4.b. Mass Layoff Statistics (MLS)
The Mass Layoff Statistics (MLS) program is the primary vehicle that the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) uses to collect information on the effect of offshoring on U.S. workers.  A “mass layoff” is13
collecting information on this economic phenomenon,” according to Brown and Siegel (2005). 
 While offshore-related layoffs are a small fraction of the total, that might not be sufficient to diminish the14
importance of such layoffs in overall displacements if offshore-related layoffs are much more costly for workers than
average layoffs. But Kletzer’s (2001a) findings suggest that this is not the case. In her study of manufacturing
displacements, she finds that the distribution of earnings losses does not depend on the degree of import competition
that the sectors face; ‘trade-displaced’ workers look little different from ‘otherwise-displaced’ workers (p.78).
 Those “relatively permanent” layoffs are about half of all layoffs, and leave out layoffs that are seasonal15
or due to factors that appear temporary (such as vacation, labor dispute, plant repair, etc). They also leave out layoffs
whose reasons are not identified. Movement of work or import competition are reasons in a negligible fraction (0.2
percent) of those excluded layoffs (see Appendix B). 
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a layoff that involves 50 or more workers within five-weeks or less. The MLS contain data on the
number of workers involved in those layoffs, their sectors of employment, and the reasons for those
layoffs, taken from a survey of employers. While the MLS survey goes back to 1992, questions that
aim to investigate offshoring were added only recently and their answers are available at the time of
this section’s writing only for 2004. The MLS data are discussed in detail in Appendix B.  Much of
the discussion in this subsection and Appendix B relies on data only published in Brown and Siegel
(2005), who are with the BLS, as well as some unpublished data that the authors kindly provided.
The MLS data identify the reasons for layoffs, and this paper considers a layoff to be offshore-related
when its reason is ‘import competition’, or when the reason is something else but the layoff involves
‘movement of work’ to an offshore location. 
The MLS data show that only a small fraction of the mass layoffs in the private sector (service or
non-service) involves movement of work abroad or import competition.   Those offshore-related14
work movements account only for about 3 percent of layoffs, and 5 percent of layoffs whose reason
that this paper identifies as having a relatively permanent nature.   Moreover, less than a tenth of15
those offshore-related layoffs were in services, although those services employ the majority of the
U.S. labor force. In contrast, manufacturing, which accounted for 26 percent of layoffs (and about
11 percent of total employment) accounted for more than 90 percent of those offshore-related
layoffs.  Manufacturing sectors contain many service jobs, such as those in IT-support or back-office
 Offshoring could also enhance real wage growth or reduce displacements in some other occupations, but16
concerns usually focus on the unfavorable effects of offshoring, rather than those favorable effects.
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services, and it is possible that some of the offshored jobs in manufacturing were actually in service
occupations.  Nevertheless, the above statistics are still very informative because they show that only
a small fraction of offshore-related layoffs takes place in service sectors, despite the fact that those
sectors constitute most of the U.S. economy and account for most of layoffs.
While those insights from the MLS are useful, four issues limit the suitability of the MLS data for
understanding the magnitude of service offshoring. First, the MLS gives information on the sectoral
distribution of layoffs, but not on the occupational distribution, obscuring whether separations
involved service jobs or production jobs. (However, new data collection initiatives by the BLS are
underway to solve this problem.) A second drawback is that, although the MLS data cover a very
large sample of layoffs, that is not a representative sample of all layoffs.  As mentioned, the MLS
is restricted to layoffs from large firms (those with 50 or more employees) and mass layoffs within
a short period of time (50 workers or more within five-weeks or less).  It is not clear if and how the
statistics of interest, such as the share of offshore-related layoffs in total layoffs, and the distribution
of layoffs over industries, might differ in that sample from the whole population (see Appendix B).
Nevertheless, the share of offshore-related displacements implied by the MLS does not appear
inconsistent with the other available estimates, which are discussed in the next section.
Third, the MLS data excludes cases of offshoring that do not involve displacements.  As explained
briefly in Section 2, that is not a problem if the focus is on displacements, but offshoring could affect
workers without displacing them. For example, offshoring could slow wage growth in some
professions even for workers who are not displaced.  Therefore, the number of displacements likely16
understates the total number of workers affected by offshoring. Nevertheless, the information in the
MLS is very useful for understanding what fraction of displacements is due to offshoring, and how
 It is worthwhile to note that the 5 percent finding is generally consistent with many other economists’17
finding that a small fraction of job churning is attributable to international trade (even when one includes
manufacturing). However, the evidence does not always appear strong when one includes manufacturing. For
example, it has been reported that only 2 percent of displacements are due to international trade (for example,
Bernanke (2004)), but the estimate is obtained by dividing a numerator by a denominator that may not be
compatible. 
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those displacements are distributed between service and non-service sectors.
Fourth, some of the import-related layoffs covered by the MLS may be recorded under a different
heading. By necessity, the MLS usually reports the proximate reasons for layoffs (such as business
ownership change, contract cancellation, financial difficulty, model changeover) rather than the
reasons that could be considered more comfortably as exogenous (such as changes in consumer
preferences, changes in production technology, increasing import competition). Schultze (2004)
writes that some layoffs may occur for reasons indirectly related to import competition even though
they are not identified as such by employers (for example, bankruptcy may be the reported reason,
but it may have been caused by import competition, either directly or indirectly through loss of
sales). Similarly, employers may fail to report some job relocations as movement of work. Those
would mean that import competition or movement of work abroad might account for more than 3
percent of layoffs (and more than 5 percent of relatively-permanent layoffs).  Nevertheless, given17
that most of those layoffs were not in services, the conclusion that service offshoring accounts for
a small fraction of layoffs appears safe.   
4.c. Published Unofficial Estimates
In addition to those official data, various academics, consultants, and interest groups have estimated
the numbers of jobs affected by offshoring. Naturally, the absence of direct, official counts of
representative samples means that those private estimates have to rely on some strong assumptions,
 Forrester estimates are taken from other citations, including Garner (2004) and Mankiw (2005). Their18
estimates are judgemental; the methodology involves Forrester’s analysts assigning a rank from 1 to 5 to different
occupations based on how rapidly they think jobs are likely to move offshore, according to Garner.
 As reported by Bernanke(2004). 19
 Mankiw (2005) reports that their estimate is 15,000 to 30,000 monthly.20
 According to Stokes (2005).21
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which may or may not be accurate. Furthermore, the methodologies behind the estimates are not
always entirely transparent, and, not surprisingly, different studies find different results.  However,
they do not appear to contradict the conclusions drawn from the official data. The purpose of this
section is not to describe or evaluate the methodologies adopted in those estimates, but rather to
report some of their results. 
A widely-cited estimate of service offshoring is by the consulting company Forrester Inc., which
estimates the cumulative number of offshored jobs by 2005 at 830,000. Forrester estimates the rate
of service offshoring at around 140,000 per year for the past five years and forecast 220,000 per year
in the next five.   Another estimate is by Goldman Sachs (2003), at 100,000 to 167,000 a year18
between 2001 and 2003 , and 180,000 to 360,000 “going forward.”   Mark Zandi of Economy.com19 20
estimates service offshoring in the range of 140,000 to 250,000 per year between 2001 and 2005.21
Blinder (2006) summarizes those and similar work by writing that “fragmentary studies indicate that
well under a million service-sector jobs in the United States have been lost to offshoring to date.”
Blinder reminds that “a million jobs is less than two weeks’ worth of normal gross job losses,”
highlighting the fact that those estimated numbers can account only for a small fraction of economy-
wide job turnover.
As for offshoring of both service and manufacturing jobs, Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004) estimate
that jobs were offshored jobs at a rate of 406,000 a year, as of the first quarter of 2004. That estimate
 That is an update from an earlier estimate of 310,000 in Kletzer (2001a), which may have been more22
frequently cited (for example, by Bernanke (2005)). 
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is based on announcements of offshored jobs that appeared in the media. The authors undertook an
extensive effort, and collected those announcements in a database that contained “information on
all production shifts announced or confirmed in the media during that period.” The number is based
on actual counts as well as the authors’ estimate of the fraction of movement of work that their
database may have missed. They make the judgmental assumption that their media tracking captures
two-thirds of offshoring to Mexico and a third of those to other countries.  That adjustment appears
to make their estimate about twice as large as their actual count.
Another estimate on the effect of trade on displacements is by Kletzer (2005), who estimated it at
the rate of 324,000 a year over the period 1979-01.  That is an earlier period than covered by most22
other estimates reported here—a period when the economy was smaller but somewhat more
turbulent. A difference that may matter more than the time period is her methodology — she takes
the average annual number of workers displaced in industries facing high import competition as her
estimate.
The estimates of Kletzer and Bronfenbrenner and Luce, which are for offshoring in both service and
non-service occupations, are not apparently inconsistent with the MLS data.  While the MLS data
show a far smaller number of offshore-related displacements (27,200 in 2004), that is only because
the MLS data cover only a fraction—about a tenth—of all layoffs. When the figure 27,200 is
projected to all separations in the United States, it yields an estimate of 280,000 (see Appendix B).
That projection assumes that offshore-related layoffs (those involve the movement of work or are
due to import competition) have the same frequency in layoffs in the MLS sample as in the whole
population. The estimate 280,000 has a similar order of magnitude with the other estimates reported
above—Bronfenbrenner and Luce’s 406,000 (which was obtained by doubling the original count)
 There were 48 million separations in the private sector in 2004 (out of a total employment of 112 million23
in that year), but only 18 million of those 48 million were due to layoffs and discharges---26 million were due to
quits, and 3 million for retirements and transfers to other locations. (Total employment increased by 2 million that
year despite the 48 million separations because there were 50 million new hires.) 
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and Kletzer’s 324,000.  Those estimates for the number of layoffs due to offshoring, ranging from
280,000 to 406,000, are very small relative to the total number of layoffs and discharges in the U.S.
economy, which were 18 million in 2004 (see Table 2).  23
<< Table 2 around here >>
A valuable piece of information documented by Bronfenbrenner and Luce is that, of the 48,400 job
losses associated with movement of work abroad that they identified in the media, only 3,900 were
to India (and some of those were nonservice jobs), while 24,400 were to Mexico and 8,300 were to
China.  Given the predominance of India in service offshoring, those numbers suggest that service
offshoring is still far less prevalent than offshoring of manufacturing jobs, which accords with the
observation in the MLS data that more than 90 percent of offshore-related layoffs were in
manufacturing.
5. Offshoring and the Information Technology (IT) Sector
The impact of service offshoring could be concentrated in specific occupations, and the effect on
those occupations could be significant even if the magnitude of service offshoring is small relative
to GDP.  Workers in those occupations would have to face not only an increased likelihood of
displacement, but also significant earnings losses even if they continued to be employed. Information
technology (IT) occupations have been given as a possible example, and service offshoring indeed
appears to have been relatively intense in the IT sector. Nevertheless, this paper finds that the
 The figure uses BPT service imports from unaffiliated parties (rather than total BPT service imports).24
That is because total BPT imports start in 1998—in order to be able to include the earlier years in the figure, only
BPT unaffiliated imports were used. (The time path of that series is similar to the total in the period they overlap.)
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employment and wage trends in IT occupations generally compare favorably to U.S. averages,
concluding that those occupations have not been put at a great disadvantage relative to other
occupations. 
A difficult time for IT occupations was the early 2000s, when they experienced large employment
losses. However, those difficulties were mainly due to the collapse of the IT boom. The rise and fall
of IT employment and wages in the late 1990s and in early 2000s paralleled the technology boom
and collapse. Figure 1 shows extended mass layoffs in IT-producing service industries and BPT
unaffiliate imports (a measure of offshore outsourcing in services). The figure suggests that the rate
of IT sector separations were not related to offshore outsourcing of services (as measured by BPT
imports) — in fact, IT separations rose sharply in the early 2000s when BPT imports sharply fell.24
That increase in IT separations rather coincided with the collapse of the IT boom. Figure 2 shows
that the sharp rise in IT separations took place when IT investment (business fixed investment in
computer equipment and software) collapsed, and those separations were quelled when IT
investment recovered.
<< Figure 1  around here >>
<< Figure 2  around here >>
When we look beyond the technology boom and bust, the general trends in IT employment and
earnings are upward — they do not give the impression of a secular decline due to offshoring. As
discussed in detail in Appendix C, IT occupations generally enjoyed faster employment and earnings
 The BLS web site explains those factors as follows: “Sophisticated computer software now has the25
capability to write basic code, eliminating the need for many programmers to do this routine work. The consolidation
and centralization of systems and applications, developments in packaged software, advances in programming
languages and tools, and the growing ability of users to design, write, and implement more of their own programs
mean that more of the programming functions can be transferred from programmers to other types of information
workers, such as computer software engineers.”
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growth between 1999 and 2004 than in the rest of the economy. However, that does not mean that
offshoring has had no effect on IT occupations.  The estimated number of offshored IT jobs is around
50,000, which is comparable to the average annual increase in the number of IT jobs in the 1994-
2004 period, which was 60,000. While those estimates are uncertain, they suggest that offshoring
cannot be dismissed as insignificant in those occupations — it is possible (if not likely) that those
occupations would have done much better without offshoring, but offshoring pushed them down
toward the U.S. average. 
Finally, while IT occupations generally did better than the U.S. average, there may be exceptions to
that within specific IT occupations. For example, the share of computer programmers in total private
employment went down from 0.40 percent to 0.30 percent between 1999 and 2004, a period when
there was no decline in the overall IT sector either in terms of GDP or employment. However,
offshoring was not the only factor in the decline in the number of computer programmers and it is
not known how much of that decline is due to offshoring and how much to other factors.  25
6.  The Future of Service Offshoring
In the medium term (over the next decade or so), service offshoring is likely to remain small relative
to the U.S. economy (although it will maintain its rapid growth rate) according to available forecasts.
A widely cited forecast by Forrester (2004) puts the number of jobs that will be offshored at 3.4
million in 2015 (2.2 percent of CBO’s civilian employment projection for that year), a relatively
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modest amount compared to the usual U.S. job market turnover—which entailed over 300 million
jobs destroyed (but even more created) in the past 10 years.
Beyond the medium term, what are the eventual limits of service offshoring? The available though
highly uncertain estimates for U.S. service jobs that could be done offshore range roughly from 10
to 20 percent of all (service and non-service) current U.S. jobs. Most jobs cannot be moved abroad
because they require physical proximity (for example, many health-care occupations). Some other
service jobs rely heavily on personal interaction with close cultural and social understanding (for
example, social workers, managers, and some sales representatives and agents). Moreover, some
authors also think that government jobs are unlikely to be offshored for political reasons (for
example, Blinder (2006)). Nevertheless, that range may over- or understate the future of offshoring,
as the underlying estimates are highly judgmental and leave out many important factors.
How long would it take for offshoring to reach its limits? While that is also highly uncertain, the
available commentaries and forecasts suggest that it would take decades. Blinder (2006) writes that
“decades is ... the time frame that people should be thinking about.” Forrester’s above-mentioned
forecast of a relatively modest amount (relative to the U.S. economy) for the next 10 years, and
projections by the McKenzie Global Institute are also consistent with that view. Factors that slow
the growth of offshoring include institutional barriers and adjustment and transaction costs.
6.a. Estimates of The Limits of Service Offshoring
This section reviews four different estimates for the number of U.S. service jobs that could be
performed in another country. Table 3 shows those estimates (expressed as percent of total U.S.
employment in service and non-service jobs) after some adjustments to enhance comparability,
 Atkinson (2006) finds Blinder’s estimate of the range of at-risk jobs too large, believing that “jobs not at26
risk today are likely to not be at risk in the future,” because the “core underlying technology is not likely to change in
significant ways over the next 25 years (beyond getting cheaper and more powerful).” Blinder’s conjecture relies on
possible changes in the use of technology as well as changes in technologies other than telecommunications, both of
which seem difficult to rule out.
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although some differences still remain in what the estimates exactly measure, as discussed below.
A notable difference is that Jensen and Kletzer’s estimate is based on tradability, which turns out to
overstate offshorability. Taking that difference into account, the studies suggest that currently —
leaving out Blinder’s conjecture that technological progress will make service jobs more offshorable
than they are now — the limit of offshorable service jobs is roughly 10 to 20 percent of all U.S. jobs.
(Appendix D provides a simple plausibility check of that range.) 
<< Table 3 around here >>
That range may under- or overestimate the future of offshoring.  It appears understated compared to
the range estimated by Blinder (2006), which is 21 to 32 percent, who assumes that future advances
in automation will increase the number of jobs that can be performed remotely and make many more
jobs suitable for offshoring. If some of the jobs that are done face-to-face today could become
computerized and less personal in the future as Blinder conjectures, that would mean the other
estimates (which do not take into account the possibility of such automation) may understate the
future of offshoring.26
Nevertheless, the range of 10-20 percent may also overstate the future of offshoring. First, the
estimates that underlie that range are not forecasts, but estimates for upper bounds that may never
be reached. The methods behind them aim to find the fraction of jobs that may be performed
remotely, but not all jobs that can be performed remotely will be. U.S. manufacturing illustrates this
well; most goods that are produced in the U.S. could be produced remotely, but U.S. manufacturing
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production was worth 75 percent of U.S. manufacturing purchases (as of 2003), employing about
11% of the workforce. The upper-bound estimates do not take into account many of the costs and
barriers discussed below in Section 6.b, which will limit service offshoring. Moreover, those
estimates do not account for the fact that increased service imports would increase the net U.S.
demand for foreign currencies, lowering the value of the exchange value of the dollar. That, in turn,
would reduce the attractiveness of service offshoring, and bolster U.S. competitiveness in world
markets. If 10 or 20 percent of U.S. jobs were offshored, the resulting increase in imports would
necessitate an equal increase in exports (barring an increase in net capital inflows), and the creation
of new export jobs in the United States. Therefore, the estimates presented in this section should be
interpreted as the percent of jobs whose nature allows them to be performed in another country,
rather than estimates of percent of jobs that will actually be offshored. 
Reasons for the Differences Among the Estimates Shown in Table 3
Blinder’s estimate (shown in Table 3 as 27 percent, the mid point of his estimated range) is the
highest, as he incorporates the possible future automation of jobs in his estimate. Blinder’s estimate
is for the number of current U.S. jobs in sectors “that will be susceptible to offshoring in the
electronic future.” Blinder does not give a precise breakdown of his estimate over sectors, but he
provides a descriptive account of his thoughts regarding different sectors, and some of those remarks
include possible future changes in the nature of offshorable jobs. The other estimates of
offshorability are apparently based on the current nature of jobs. 
Jensen and Kletzer's reported estimate is 39 percent, but that includes manufacturing and government
jobs, and the estimate would be about 23 percent excluding those, and their estimate is not for
offshorability but for an imperfectly estimated concept of “tradability.” Jensen and Kletzer measure
the tradability of a given sector based on the degree of geographic concentration of production in that
 Jensen and Kletzer’s approach relies on judgement less heavily than others, but it still requires a27
judgmental choice for the cutoff degree of tradability that divides the sectors into two groups as tradable and
nontradable. 
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sector. If production of a good or service is concentrated in a geographical area such as a state, either
that good or service is tradable, or it is consumed more intensely in that state. Jensen and Kletzer’s
methodology judges, for example, accommodation as tradable, probably because it is concentrated
in states such as Florida (and tourism related services are indeed classified as tradable in the national
accounts).  However, most jobs in accommodation are unsuitable for including in the concept of27
offshoring, as explained in Section 2 (and also by Blinder (2006)). Similarly, the transportation and
warehousing sector is identified mostly as tradable by Jensen and Kletzer. In contrast, many
transportation and material moving jobs are not offshorable because most of them entail activities
such as driving. Jensen and Kletzer’s method also identifies most jobs in real estate and rental and
leasing as tradable, although most real estate jobs, from real estate managers to appraisers to sales
agents, do not appear to be offshorable.
The third highest estimate is by Van Welsum and Reif, who estimate the limit at 18 percent (as of
2003), but their estimate would be 15 percent if they excluded government jobs, as many of the other
estimates do. Van Welsum and Reif look at detailed CPS categories and identify some occupations
as offshorable based on several criteria, including the intensive use of information technology. They
then assume that all jobs in those occupations may be offshorable. 
Bardhan and Kroll’s (2003) estimate, 11 percent, is lower than the rest, but that appears to be partly
because they exclude some jobs that might be offshorable. The authors "only take into account those
occupations where at least some outsourcing has already taken placed or is being planned, according
to business literature." Consequently, Bardhan and Kroll do not include, for example, protective
service occupations, although some of those jobs (for example, guards monitoring cameras) could
 Jensen and Kletzer’s results based on a breakdown of occupations are not intuitive. According to that28
breakdown, production jobs are generally not tradable, while construction jobs are. However, a review of those
occupations suggest the reverse. While some production workers may not produce tradable goods (such as dry-
cleaning workers), a majority of production jobs do (such as assemblers and machinists). Construction occupations
consists of carpenters, cement masons, painters, plumbers, equipment operators and alike—which do not appear to
be offshorable. 
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be performed remotely, at least in principal. This paper’s assessment, which is detailed in Appendix
D, is that including those occupations that Bardhan and Kroll leave out could increase their estimate
to 15 percent, to the level of the estimate of Van Welsum and Reif. 
Another difference between the approaches underlying those five estimates is whether they analyze
jobs based on a breakdown over occupations or industries, although that does not appear to be a
major source of difference between the final estimates. A breakdown over occupations allows
assessing offshorability more directly than a breakdown over sectors. For example, the truck
transportation industry employs 1.36 million workers, but at most 1.03 million of those workers are
actually in transportation and material moving occupations  (such as truck drivers). The remaining
0.33 million jobs are in other occupations that may or may not be offshorable, and whether they are
or not can be decided better by looking at their respective occupations, which is not possible in a
breakdown over industries. Two of the above five estimates (Bardhan and Kroll and VanWelsum
and Reif) rely on a review of occupations, while two others (Blinder and McKinsey) review
industries. Jensen and Kletzer analyze the data in both ways, but their preferred specification uses
a breakdown over industries rather than occupations.  28
6.b. Factors That Limit or Slow the Growth of Service Offshoring
There are important limitations on service offshoring. Some of those reduce the future limits of
offshoring, but are not taken into account fully in the estimates discussed in Section 6.a. Some others
 Some of the limitations listed here should also slow the growth of domestic outsourcing. The latter is29
much more prevalent than offshoring, which suggests that the reasons related to offshore outsourcing have so far
been more restrictive than the ones that apply both to domestic and offshore outsourcing. 
 “The math of looking only at salaries is just wrong. And it is a prevalent misconception,”says Joseph30
Feiman of Gartner Inc. (a research firm), as quoted in the New York Times article, “Offshore Jobs in Technology:
Opportunity or Threat?”, Dec 22, 2003. McKinsey (2003) estimate the cost savings at 60 percent. While significant,
that is smaller than what the wage differentials would suggest.
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slow the growth of offshoring, although they would not necessarily affect its limits.  29
First, as mentioned, the estimates usually ignore many of the cultural, linguistic and institutional
impediments to offshoring. Institutional barriers include “labor market regulations in the home
country, such as high statutory severance awards; product market regulations in the home country
that restricts, for example, where a service can be provided; and insufficient legal protection for
intellectual property in offshore locations” (McKinsey (2005b)). Some of those barriers can be
subtle. For example, radiologist positions are popularly assumed offshorable, but a reading of Levy
(2005) suggests that institutional factors greatly limit the offshorability of those positions.  Levy
reports that the offshored medical images are not “read by cheap foreign doctors,” but by
“radiologists who are U.S.-board-certified and credentialed in the hospital where the image was
taken—a necessity if the firm is to acquire malpractice insurance.” In addition to malpractice fears,
the other limiting factors that Levy cites are “radiologists’ professional power, insurance
reimbursement regulations, and the cognitive structure of reading medical images that makes it
difficult to monitor offshored work.” According to McKinsey (2005a), management’s unfamiliarity
with or reluctance toward offshoring are also factors that limit offshoring.
Second, while wages are much lower between the United States and some other countries, actual cost
savings tend to be much less than what those wage differentials might suggest, due to additional
transaction costs arising from the remote management of work in another country.  Those costs30
 But the demand-side costs are even more restrictive than qualified labor supply, according to McKinsey.31
McKinsey's forecast of realized service offshoring for 2008 is 1.2 percent of jobs, not only below their theoretical
maximum of 9 percent, but also below their estimate of the qualified labor supply.
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make offshoring viable currently only for larger firms. Adjustment costs from changing the existing
production processes and the profile of the workforce also reduce the overall cost savings from
offshoring.
Third,  the above estimates do not take into account the constraints in the supply of qualified workers
in the host countries. Workers in many developing countries have lower levels of education than in
the United States, and the same level of education might correspond to a lower level of skill.
Language skills and cultural impediments can become even more significant without properly
qualified workers. According to the estimates of McKinsey’s (2005b) study on the labor supply in
developing countries suitable for offshoring, qualified and available labor is less, and will stay less,
in the medium term than their “theoretical maximum” (i.e., the limit that McKinsey estimates for
offshoring).  31
Finally, the rise of service offshoring took place at a time when the dollar was strong, foreign
economies were weak, and the widening of the trade deficit was unprecedented.  It is considered
inevitable that the U.S. trade deficit will turn around and start narrowing eventually, likely
accompanied by a fall in the dollar.  A dollar depreciation would slow the growth of offshoring (as
well as other imports) and enhance the growth of onshoring (and other U.S. exports).
6.c. Structural Change: A Constant in the U.S. Economy 
Service offshoring may eventually become a much more important part of economic life in the
United States than it is now, but U.S. occupations have undergone much greater structural changes
 This assumes that the remaining three quarters of jobs have the same nature as they did in 1967. To the32
extent they are different, the pace of structural change would be greater than this simple calculation suggests.
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in the past, without causing mass unemployment or decline in overall living standards. As Blinder
notes, agriculture accounted for 14 percent of U.S. employment in 1947, but accounts for less than
2 percent today.  According to calculations by Nordhaus (1994), under 30 percent of goods and
services consumed today were variants of those produced at the beginning of the 20  century.  “Weth
travel in vehicles that were not yet invented that are powered by fuels not yet produced, communicate
through devices not yet manufactured, enjoy cool air on the hottest days, are entertained by electronic
wizardry that was not dreamed of and receive medical treatments that were unheard of.” A more
recent comparison by Parry (2004) shows that structural changes have continued in recent decades:
“about a quarter of today's labor force is in jobs that did not even exist in 1967.” That last
observation portrays a structural change that has replaced about one million jobs a year on average.32
Those structural changes are driven by changes in technology, and the pace of technological change
does not appear any slower now than in the past. It seems likely that the structure of U.S. occupations
will be quite different in a few decades, whether offshoring proves to be important or not.
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Appendix A. Service Offshoring in BEA’s Service Imports Data
This appendix discusses in detail the main issues related to the BEA’s service imports data used in
Section 2.  Those data conceptually overlap with service offshoring fairly well. There are some
potential differences but are relatively minor, and are discussed in Section A.1.  Section A.2
discusses a concern regarding the accuracy of the data that arises from a mismatch between the
statistics reported by the BEA and those reported by India.  Those concerns do not appear to be
important enough to overturn the conclusions drawn from those data in this paper.
A.1. Dissecting Service Imports: Which Categories Are Relevant for Offshoring Concerns?
Virtually all service imports relevant to service offshoring are in the business, professional and
technical services (BPT) subcategory of other private services. All the main service imports
categories other than other private services are unrelated to offshoring concerns. (U.S. services do
not provide close substitutes for those, and they are not the type of imports that are subject to popular
concerns.) Those categories are travel, passenger fares, other transportation, royalties and license
fees, and two categories related to military and other government operations. Those together cover
two-thirds of service imports. Within the other private services category, which accounts for the
remaining one-third of service imports, the subcategories other than BPT are also generally unrelated
to service offshoring. Those subcategories of other private services are education, insurance,
operational leasing, financial services (fees and commissions on securities trading, fund
management, etc), telecommunications (settlements between telecom companies, channel leasing
etc—not Indian computer programmers’ services), and other services (payments for embassy
workers, rentals of motion pictures, etc.). 
The coverage of the BPT category does not perfectly correspond to offshoring concerns, either. First,
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some imports included in BPT cannot be considered as service offshoring (such as payments to
lawyers for representation in another country's court), which might make BPT imports an
exaggerated measure of offshoring. (As mentioned before, that is not a problem for this main
conclusion from this data set that the amount of service offshoring is small relative to the U.S.
economy.) Second, the BPT category may exclude some imports that could be considered as
offshoring: the subcategory management and advisory services is not under BPT but under the
category of financial services, and contains activities some of which could be considered offshoring,
such as imports of advanced financial analysis services.  However, the United States imports a small
amount in that subcategory and exports much more than it imports. Imports of management and
advisory services  were $0.6 billion while exports were $7.4 billion in 2004. 
A.2. Possible Undercounting of BPT Imports
A source of concern regarding the BPT data is the possible understatement of BPT imports and, to
a lesser extent, BPT exports. Those concerns arise from a major discrepancy between imports from
India reported by the United States and exports to the United States reported by India. GAO (2005)
reports that the BEA’s measures of BPT imports in 2003 from India is about one-twentieth of the
measure reported by the Reserve Bank of India ($0.4 billion vs $8.7 billion).  Indian statistics also
show discrepancies with other developed country statistics.  The Reserve Bank of India reports that
India exported to the rest of the world $9.6 billion worth of computer and information services in
2002, while imports from India reported by the United States, the European Union, Japan and
Canada in that year totaled only $0.3 billion (see Table 2.11 in OECD 2004). 
A reason for the difference between the U.S. and Indian statistics is that country-by-country statistics
that the BEA reports do not include imports from affiliated firms (i.e., from U.S. subsidiary or parent
 That is not the case for BPT totals reported in Table 1 — BPT exports and imports in that table cover33
trade with both affiliated and unaffiliated firms.
 That is consistent with the observation in the MLS data that 80 percent of the offshored jobs for which34
detailed information is available were within the same company (based on Table 4. in Brown and Siegel 2005).  
Bronfenbrenner and Luce (2004) find that a somewhat smaller percentage, 58 percent, of firms that shifted
production abroad did so to a subsidiary company, although that statistics is not weighted by the size of the
employment shifts, and it may not include shifts from a U.S. subsidiary to a parent company abroad.
 The account of that difference here largely relies on GAO and BEA. For first-hand information on India’s35
data on trade in services, see Reserve Bank of India (2005).
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companies in India.)   In contrast, the Indian statistics count both affiliated and unaffiliated imports,33
which is a reason why the U.S. data should show a smaller amount.  However, that difference is not
likely to be large enough to explain the discrepancy fully. GAO (2005) reports that three-quarters
of all U.S. imports of BPT services represented trade within multinational firms.   Consequently,34
once that conceptual difference is accounted for, the difference may decrease to 4- or 5- fold from
the original 20-fold, but there would still remain a large discrepancy.
GAO (2005) shows that much of that remaining discrepancy might be accounted for by some
methodological approaches adopted by India. First, Indian nationals working in the United States are
included in the Indian data, but not in the U.S. data unless those workers have been in the United
States for less than a year.  Indian officials estimate that this factor accounts for 40 to 50 percent of
the remaining difference between the U.S. and Indian data, according to the GAO report.  Second,
India treats sales to U.S.-owned firms located outside the United States as exports to the United
States. The GAO report does not give a specific estimate about the effect of that, but, according to
the GAO report, “one high-level Indian official stated that it is likely a significant factor.”  Finally,
some international trade that the BEA classifies (in accordance with international standard practices)
as merchandise trade is included in Indian statistics as service trade. An example of those is software
embedded on computer hardware. This inclusion on the Indian side is estimated by an Indian official
to account for 10 to 15 percent of Indian exports (and a larger fraction of the discrepancy).   35
 However, the conclusion that the United States is a net exporter of BPT services would become less36
certain; BEA is less likely to undercount exporters because the exporters tend to be larger and are easier to identify.
The lack of a perfect coverage is more likely to plague statistics on BPT imports more than those on BPT exports. 
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The GAO report also identifies that BEA undercounts some imports, but those are not significant.
GAO conducted a test of BEA’s coverage of importing firms, by making a list of firms based on
public sources and checking that list against BEA’s list of surveyed importers.  The BEA’s list did
indeed exclude some companies that should have been in the list.  However, BEA’s comment
included in the report states that “BEA did not identify any company with substantial imports of
services that were not already being reported to the BEA.”  The particular GAO test did not appear
to have revealed a significant problem in the accuracy of the BPT import data reported by the BEA.
While GAO recommends more work to make sure that BEA’s statistics cover all imports properly,
the conclusion that the amount of service offshoring is small relative to overall GDP would be
robust. Most of the discrepancy is established to be due to the difference in concepts used in Indian
exports data, which may not always overlap with the standard international practice. Even if there
is undercounting on the part of BEA, given that much of the difference is already accounted for,
BEA is not likely to be leaving out more than 60 percent of BPT imports. While 60 percent would
be a large degree of undercounting on the part of BEA (which the GAO report does not find evidence
for), BPT imports that are reported in Table 1 are small enough that even multiplying them by 2.5
would not alter the conclusion they are small relative to U.S. GDP.36
Finally, it is possible that Indian statistics are also undercounting. However, the main source data for
Indian statistics is NASSCOM, an Indian IT lobby (not a statistical agency itself), and the Indian
firms have an incentive not to underreport—their data are used to qualify for certain tax incentives
and infrastructure benefits (see GAO 2005). That incentive structure likely discourages
underreporting.
 The economies of scale in offshoring are mentioned in McKinsey (2005a), and in “Offshoring Jobs: U.S.37
and Australian Debates”, Research Brief by the Department of Parliamentary Services (Parliament of Australia),
March 14, 2005.
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Appendix B. Offshoring in the Mass Layoff Statistics of the BLS
This appendix complements the discussion in Section 2.b, adding to its description of the MLS data
and its discussion of what can be learned from them about offshoring.  As mentioned in Section 2.b,
much of the discussion here relies on the data published by Brown and Siegel (2005).
B.1. Possible Biases: the MLS Coverage May Be Unrepresentative of U.S. Layoffs
The main drawback of the MLS data is that they cover only mass layoffs from relatively large firms,
leaving out many layoffs and discharges. It is not clear how that sample selection affects the
characteristics of interest — for example, it is not known whether the frequency of offshoring would
be higher or lower in mass layoffs than in the layoffs that are left out.
As for the restriction related to the firm size, the MLS data sample leaves out firms that employ less
than 50 workers. That restriction might result in an overstatement of offshoring as a reason for
layoffs, as offshoring is less likely to be economical for small firms.   As for the restriction on the37
size and intensity of the layoffs, the MLS sample is restricted to layoffs that are concentrated in a
short time period; it leaves out layoffs that involve less than 50 workers within a five-week period.
That second restriction might result in an understatement of offshoring because firms may prefer to
make adjustments associated with movement of work (MOW) more gradually than in other types
of separations, whose reasons include company reorganization, bankruptcy, and contract cancellation
or completion. On the whole, it is not clear if there is a net bias, and, if there is, in which direction
it would go.
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The first restriction, that firms employ 50 or more workers, makes the sample 44 percent smaller
than otherwise (Brown and Siegel 2005).  Adding the second restriction (that layoffs be concentrated
within a short-period) reduces the sample by about 90 percent; the MLS recorded only 1.7 million
separations in 2003, less than a tenth of the 18.6 million layoffs and discharges economy-wide
recorded by the more comprehensive Job Openings and Labor Turnover (JOLTS) survey of the BLS.
Those two observations suggest that the second restriction (that layoffs be concentrated within a
short period with 50 or more workers) limits the sample somewhat more than the first restriction on
the firm size.  
Those restrictions may also affect the inferred distribution of offshoring by sector.  For example, if
manufacturing firms tend to be larger than those in service sectors, that would result in an over-
representation of manufacturing in overall layoffs.  However, manufacturing accounted for 26
percent of all separations, but 91 percent of the separations that involved movement of work abroad,
and even a larger fraction of the separations due to import competition. It seems that if there is a bias
from the MLS sample selection to the estimate of frequency of separations, that bias would affect
both of those two estimates (26 percent and 91 percent) and would not explain why the latter is so
much larger than the former.
B.2. Offshore-related Layoffs in the MLS Data
As mentioned in the text, when the reason for a given layoff is “import competition”, or it is due to
some other reason but involves movement of work abroad, that layoff is taken to be offshore-related.
The MLS does not give a precise number for the separations that involve movement of work
(MOW), but rather a range. Brown and Siegel (2005) write that the number of separations involving
MOW (domestic or offshore) that the MLS data covered was in “a range of 55,122 to 73,217" in
 The upper bound, 73,217, is the number of separations involved in all layoff events that involved a38
MOW, which consisted of 480 MOW actions and (presumably) an unreported number of non-MOW actions. The
number of separated workers was specified in 382 of those 480 MOW actions, and those added up to 55,122. (For
52,443 of those 55,122 separations, it was further specified whether the destination was domestic or offshore,
making the computation in the previous footnote possible.) The remaining 98 MOWactions for which the number of
separations was not specified and the unknown number of non-MOW actions account for the difference between
73,217 and 55,122.
 Brown and Siegel (2005) report that, among 52,443 MOW separations for which detailed info is39
available (i.e., excluding separations with unassigned location), 16,917 (30.9 percent) moved abroad while 32,246
(69.1 percent) stayed within the United States. 
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2004.  In the analysis below and in Table B-1, the upper bound, 73,217, is assumed, which may38
have inflated the estimate of the number of offshored jobs.  Detailed information on whether work
moved domestically or internationally is available for only 52,400 MOW separations.  Those show
that 69 percent of the MOWs were domestic movements and 31 percent offshore.   The breakdown39
of the 73,217 MOWs into domestic and abroad is assumed to be also 61 percent and 39 percent, in
the same proportion as in the 52,400 MOW separations for which the breakdown is known.
There were a total of 1.5 million separations in 2004 covered by the MLS (see Table B-1). About
two thirds of those were temporary in nature (separations lasting less than 31 days, separations due
to vacation or seasonal reasons, etc), or their reasons were not reported (either by the employer or
by the BLS).  It is more appropriate to focus on the remaining half a million separations that are
likely to have a relatively permanent nature and for which more complete reporting is available.
Table B-2 shows that only 5.3 percent of those “relatively-permanent” separations involved
movement of work abroad or import competition. 
<< Table B-1 around here >>
<< Table B-2 around here >>
How permanent are those “relatively-permanent” separations?  Davis et. al. (1996) report that “most
 Davis et al (1996) estimate that, given the amounts of ‘job reallocation’ (job destruction or creation due40
to firm contractions/closings and expansions/openings) and their estimate of ‘worker reallocation’ (changes in
workers’ employment or jobs relative to a year ago) in the manufacturing sector, job reallocations and the ordinary
life-cycle turnover (the turnover due to retirements and entry of new workers) together must account for at least 44
percent of worker reallocations. That is a lower bound that assumes each contraction or closing (or expansion or
opening) results in no further reshuffling (for example, due to a chain of further quits as displaced workers displace
other workers in firms that are not contracting). Such secondary waves would mean job creation and destruction
accounts for a larger fraction of labor market turnover (Davis et al pages 36-37). This finding is based on the
manufacturing sector in the period 1972-1988. “Worker reallocations” consider employment changes relative to 12-
month earlier, which implies that separations with short duration (such as those that last less than 31 days, or those
due to seasonal, vacation, and repair reasons) are likely to be represented less often in worker reallocations than in
the MLS.
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jobs that vanish over a twelve-month interval fail to reopen at the same location within the following
two years” (p.17) — once a job is destroyed, it is not created again for a substantially long time.
While a “worker relocation” (or separation) is different from a “job destruction” (firm contraction
or closing), much of worker relocations (possibly half) involve firm expansions and contractions.40
Based on those, it seems likely that the “relatively-permanent” separations identified in Table B-2
have a significant overlap with firm expansions and contractions, and, therefore, are fairly long-
lasting.
Going back to the 5.3 percent of separations that were due to import competition or MOW abroad,
a great majority (90 percent) of them were in manufacturing, although manufacturing accounted for
only 26 percent of the total extended separations in 2004.  (Manufacturing  accounted for 72 percent
of MOWs, 91 percent of MOWs abroad, and even a larger fraction of separations arising from import
competition.)
What would the MLS data imply in terms of number of offshore-related displacements economy-
wide?  From Table B-2, offshore-related layoffs (layoffs that involve MOW abroad or import
competition) accounted for 27,164, or 1.5 percent, of the total 1.5 million separations in the MLS.
If that is projected to the 18.4 million layoffs and discharges in 2003 reported by JOLTS, that would
amount to 280,000 displacements in a year, both in manufacturing and services.
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Appendix C. Offshoring and the Information Technology (IT) Sector
IT occupations have been affected more by offshoring than most other occupations. When those
occupations experienced significant employment losses in early 2000s, offshoring was cited as a
possible cause.  Offshoring may indeed have had a significant effect on IT occupations, in the sense
that perhaps IT workers would have been significantly better off without offshoring.  However, the
main source of the employment loss in IT occupations in the early 2000s was the collapse of the IT
boom of the late 1990s.  Furthermore, when we look beyond the effect of the technology boom and
its collapse, IT occupations as a whole are not in a disadvantaged situation relative to the U.S.
average. Those occupations have seen faster wage and employment growth than the average, they
have lower unemployment rates than the average, and they make above-average wages. However,
looking more closely at individual IT occupations, computer programmers appear to be a group that
may have been affected by offshoring. 
Two occupations that are sometimes considered as IT are not included in IT in this Appendix. First,
data entry keyers is not an IT occupation in the usual sense — it is an entry level occupation for low-
skill workers, where next step is usually an administrative or clerical (i.e., non-IT) job. The other is
computer operators, whose numbers are falling due to technical change (rather than offshoring)
according to the BLS description for that profession.
C.1.  The IT Sector Has Experienced A High Degree of Offshoring
Available estimates suggest that IT occupations have accounted for a disproportionately large share
of offshoring compared to the size of IT services in the U.S. economy.  Stokes (2005) cites Forrester
Research’s estimate that a quarter of all service offshoring is in the IT sectors.  Bednarzik (2005)
surveys several studies that estimate annual employment losses of around 50,000 jobs per year
 This is based on the following data taken from Brown and Siegel (2005). They report that there were41
993.5 thousand jobs lost in extended mass layoff episodes in the private nonfarm sector, of which 73.2 thousand took
place in separations involving movement of work (Table B-1).  In contrast, the IT-producing industries lost 40.4
thousand jobs, of which 10.3 thousand involved movement of work (Brown and Siegel (2005), page 6).
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(between 34,000 and 65,000).  Baily and Lawrence (2004) estimate that rate at 45,000 per year.
Given the size of IT workforce, which is around 3 million and had an average growth of 60,000 jobs
per year between 1994 and 2004, the offshoring of 50,000 jobs a year may very well have had a
measurable impact on IT workers. 
Those estimates mostly come from private consultant firms (an exception is the 65,000 estimate by
Bhagwati et al, but that estimate is based on NASSCOM’s estimate of the increase in personnel in
India), and are highly uncertain.  Nevertheless, official MLS data show that the IT sector has been
more prone than the average sector to layoffs associated with movement of work (within the United
States or abroad).  In 2004, movement of work was about three to four times as often in mass layoffs
in IT-producing industries as in those in the overall nonfarm business sector— 25 percent vs. 7.4
percent.   (A breakdown of those percentages into movement abroad and movement within the41
United States is not available.)
C.2. Employment and Earnings in the IT Sector Have Grown Faster than U.S. Averages Since
1999
The number of jobs in computer and mathematical occupations, which were 97 percent computer,
network and data related as of 2004 and cover most IT jobs, was 11 percent higher in 2004 than its
1999 level (see Figure 1). Total employment grew 4.3 percent over the same period. 
<< Figure C-1 around here >> 
The choice of detailed occupations in Table C-1 is based on Bednarzik (2005), which is similar to that in42
Department of Commerce (2003), except that Bednarzik excludes some occupations such as Engineering Managers
and Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Those are occupations that have seen above-average employment and
earnings growth in the period 1999 to 2004. 
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However, there are IT-related occupations that fall outside the computer and mathematical
occupations category. The group of IT occupations can be chosen (or ‘defined’) in different ways,
and different definitions can tell different stories. Rather than relying on a particular definition, a
better insight can be obtained by looking at detailed IT-related occupation categories, which are
shown in Table C-1 for the period 1999-2004.   Note that the table shows employment in IT42
occupations rather than in IT sectors, and that has an advantage because many IT employees work
in non-IT sectors. (The table could be extended to earlier years if it used IT sectors instead of IT
occupations. However, it would not be showing IT jobs, because IT sectors employ many non-IT
workers and leave out IT workers who are employed in other sectors.)
<< Table C-1 around here>>
The effect of the technology boom and bust is reflected in Table C-1 by the rise in IT employment
from 1999 to 2000, and the fall between 2000 and 2002, in many of the detailed categories.  Much
of the variation in those years around the 2001 recession is apparently dominated by that technology
boom.  Focusing on the changes from 1999 to 2004 is helpful for looking beyond the effects of that
boom and understanding what the trends in those occupations have been — and whether if those
trends show any signs of adverse affects from offshoring. Those changes are shown in Table C-2,
which sorts those IT-related occupations by their rate of employment growth from 1999 to 2004.
However, it needs to be noted that 1999 was also a good year for the IT sector, and employment
changes from 1999 to 2004 still contain an element of coming down from a peak due to the
technology bust, which makes employment growth over the period lower than otherwise. (The data
do not go back to before 1999, as the classification underlying those data, the Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC) system, is relatively recent.)  Table C-2 also shows the changes in wages in
 “Computer operators usually receive on-the-job training,” according to the description for that43
occupation at the BLS web site, although “the length of training varies with the job and the experience of the
worker.” 
 Those two occupations saw employment falling not only from 1999 and 2004, but also in every year in44
that period, even between 1999 to 2000 when the other IT occupations were growing strongly. Despite that large
employment decline, both occupations showed earnings growth similar to the economy-wide averages (3.0 and 3.1
percent vs 3.3 percent economy-wide). That above-average earnings growth could be due to compositional effects; if
low-skill computer operators drop out due to automation while high-skill ones stay, average earnings in that category
could rise even if each worker’s earnings stayed the same. 
 “Computer operators rank among the most rapidly declining occupations over the 2004-14 period45
because advances in technology are making many of the duties traditionally performed by computer operators
obsolete,” according to the BLS website. 
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those occupations from 1999 to 2004 (both in levels and percentages) and the levels in 2004. 
<< Table C-2 around here>>
In Tables C-1 and C-2, two occupations are separated out at the end, and will be left out of much of
the remaining discussion. The first one is data entry keyers. While that occupation is usually
included in the information sector, it is very different than other IT sector occupations in several
ways. The work of data entry keyers does not appear to involve the high-level technical skills that
are common for IT workers. That occupation, according to the BLS, is typically an entry level job
for high school graduates. Accordingly, data entry keyers command much lower earnings than other
IT workers, which is confirmed in the last column of Table C-2. The next step for workers who
move on from that occupation is an administrative job not related to IT, “such as secretary,
administrative assistant, or statistical clerk.”
The second occupation that will be left out from most of the rest of the discussion are computer
operators, who, unlike data entry keyers, are truly an IT occupation, but exhibit features similar to
those of data entry keyers, such as lower earnings and lower-level of education than in other IT
occupations,  and have had declining employment.   The BLS attributes the employment decline43 44
in computer operators to technological change.  Both in terms of the skill level of the occupation45
 CPS measure uses a less exact survey on occupations, and is therefore not preferred although it goes46
further back in time.
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and the factors that drive the trends in it, the computer operators category does not appear likely to
help understanding offshoring in IT occupations.
Table C-2 shows that employment in IT service occupations (excluding data entry keyers and
computer operators) grew nearly three times faster than the national average (12.4 percent as
opposed to 4.3 percent).  However, employment in some IT occupations did not rise. There was a
large fall in the number of computer programmers, and some declines in three other IT occupations.
Those declines may be puzzling given that each of those four occupations enjoyed above-average
wage growth (and starting with earnings levels that were already above average), but the reason for
those conflicting signs may be compositional effects.  Similarly, employment rose very strongly in
the category of network systems and data communications analysts, but wage growth was not strong,
which is suggestive of compositional change.  
Among those three occupations with falling employment, computer programmers may indeed have
done worse than the average U.S. worker (in terms of employment opportunities and earnings),
although it is not possible to determine that conclusively with the available data. One factor is that
1999 was close to the peak of the technology boom, and the employment decline in that occupation
between 1999 and 2004 could be partly due to the collapse of that boom.  Data from the CPS
measure of that occupation, which goes back farther in time, confirms that intuition; some of the
large decline between 1999 and 2004 was indeed due to the collapse of the IT boom (see Figure 2).46
(It appears, though, that similar extensions for the other three occupations that lost employment
would likely reverse the conclusion that they did so.) However, employment of computer
programmers in 2004 was below its 1994 level, confirming the downward trend in employment in
that occupation, at least relative to the rest of the economy. Furthermore, the BLS description
acknowledges that downward trend, attributes it to technical change as well as offshoring, and
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forecasts it to continue in the future. However, it is not clear how much each of those two factors
(offshoring and technical change) is responsible in that occupation’s declining employment.
Moreover, the growth of computer programmers’ earnings was above-average over the period,
which makes it difficult to reach a strong conclusion that computer programmers have had it worse
than the average U.S. occupation in those years. 
<< Figure C-2 around here >>
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Appendix D. An Assessment of the Limits of Service Offshoring
This section provides additional detail on this paper’s assessment that a plausible range for the limits
of service offshoring (which is subject to the caveats in discussed in Section 6) is 10 to 20 percent
of current U.S. jobs. The assessment relies on an examination of the detailed occupations of the
Occupational Employment Survey (OES). The OES survey details 803 occupations, covering all jobs
except self-employed and household workers. (The OES sample size was 128 million workers in
2004, a year when civilian employment was 135 million.)  The review of occupations is limited to
the larger ones that employed more than 0.1 percent of workers. There were 212 such occupations,
accounting for 83 percent of the total employment covered by the survey. There is no obvious bias
in the excluded smaller occupations towards too much or too little offshorability. Altogether, about
a fifth of jobs was left out of the analysis, either because they were in small occupations, or were
self-employed or household jobs and therefore not included in the sample. Those excluded
occupations are assumed to have the same rate of offshorability as the reviewed four-fifths of jobs,
although many of those left-out jobs (such as those in lawyer’s offices, dental practices, and small
convenience stores) may not be offshorable.
For each of those 212 occupations, a judgmental estimate (with only one digit after the decimal) is
made for the share of offshorable jobs for that occupation. For example, consider one of the largest
detailed occupations, retail salespersons, which employed 3.2 percent of the work force in 2004.
Most retail jobs are face-to-face, and therefore appear not suitable to be performed remotely. It is
possible that, in the future, a large share of those retail sales jobs become offshorable. Blinder
(2006), for example, assumes so in his estimate of the future limit of offshoring. However, this
paper’s estimate is meant for the current share of U.S. jobs, and the current nature of those jobs does
not appear to make them suitable for offshoring. Nevertheless, the share of offshorable retail sales
jobs may be greater than zero because some retail work may currently be done online. Consequently,
the assessment assumed 0.1 (10 percent) for the share of offshorable jobs in retail salespersons.
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An important source of uncertainty is the judgements about the offshorability of individual
occupations. To obtain a sense of the amount of the uncertainty resulting from those judgments, an
estimate is made as follows. The share of offshorable jobs in each occupation is assigned a standard
deviation between 0.15 and 0.5. The latter value, 0.5, is the highest standard deviation a random
variable ranging between 0 and 1 can have, and therefore cannot understate uncertainty in the share
estimate in a given occupation. That maximum uncertainty is assumed to be the case in a given
occupation if the offshorable share in that occupation is estimated as 50 percent. However, when the
estimated share of offshorable jobs in an occupation is closer to 0 or 1, that is considered to be a sign
that more information is available about that occupation, and the judgment is less vague. Therefore,
the closer the value is to 0 or 1, a lower standard deviation is assumed. In particular, the standard
deviation is assumed to be 0.15 when the estimated share is 0 or 1 in a given occupation. The
assumed value of that standard deviation is varied between 0.15 and 0.5, depending linearly on the
difference of the share estimate from 0.5. In particular, when the estimated share is 0.2 or 0.8, the
assumed standard deviation for that share estimate is 0.29. That uncertainty estimate can also be
considered generous, given that 0.29 is the standard deviation of a random variable distributed
uniformly between 0 and 1, which would be the distribution for a random variable for which we
know nothing except that it is a real number between 0 and 1. However, when the estimated share
is 0.2 or 0.8, that is a sign that there is at least some knowledge of the occupation in question and
how suitable it is for offshoring — therefore, the assigned standard deviation can be considered
generous. 
Going back to the example from retail jobs, further research could be done into the nature of those
jobs to obtain a better estimate, but, instead, the “law of large numbers” (that the uncertainty in
estimates for individual occupations round out to a lesser uncertainty in total) was relied upon.  For
example, while the estimated number of offshorable jobs in retail salespersons is 413,000, the
standard deviation of that estimate is 826,000, nearly twice as large as the estimate itself. However,
in the aggregate, while the estimated number of offshorable jobs is 18.7 million, the standard
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deviation of that estimate is 2.7 million, about one-seventh of the estimate itself. (The 90 percent
confidence interval that corresponds to that standard deviation is roughly 10 to 20 percent, with the
mid point of 15 percent.) Since there are a fairly large number of occupations in the estimate, the law
of large numbers ensures a reasonably tight distribution for the final estimate, as long as the
estimates of the offshorable share of jobs within occupations are not biased. Consequently, it is not
very important that the judgments for individual occupations are accurate, although it is important
that those judgments are made without bias by the researcher doing the review.
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Figure 1.  Offshore Service Outsourcing, and IT Service Sector Layoffs
(thousands of workers) (Billions of dollars)
Source: Brown and Siegel (2005) and BEA.
Figure 2.  IT Investment Boom and Collapse, and IT Service Sector Layoffs
(thousands of workers) (Billions of dollars)
Source: Brown and Siegel (2005) and BEA.
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Figure C-1.  Employment in Computer and Mathematical Occupations
(thousands of workers)
Source: BLS Occupational Employment Survey (http://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_dl.htm)
Figure C-2.  Employment of Computer Programmers
(thousands of workers)
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Table 1.  Trade in Business, Professional, and Technical Services
(Billions of dollars)
 Level Change memo:
 Exports Imports
Net
Exports Exports Imports
Net
Exports U.S. GDP
 Total Unaffiliated Total Unaffiliated      
1992  11.7  3.2     6,337.8
1993  13.0  3.6     6,657.4
1994  15.3  4.0     7,072.2
1995  16.1  4.9     7,397.7
1996  19.5  5.7     7,816.8
1997 43.9 21.5 20.8 6.5 23.0    8,304.3
1998 45.3 22.7 22.0 7.5 23.3 1.5 1.2 0.2 8,747.0
1999 53.5 27.7 27.6 8.6 25.9 8.2 5.6 2.6 9,268.4
2000 54.3 25.3 29.1 9.1 25.2 0.8 1.5 -0.7 9,817.0
2001 58.9 28.2 30.4 9.5 28.5 4.6 1.3 3.3 10,128.0
2002 62.0 29.2 33.5 9.7 28.5 3.1 3.1 0.0 10,469.6
2003 66.6 31.5 37.5 11.4 29.1 4.5 4.0 0.5 10,971.3
2004 71.0 33.8 40.7 12.5 30.3 4.5 3.3 1.2 11,734.3
Avg change between 1999-2003   3.3 2.5 0.8 425.7
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      Table 2.  Labor Market Turnover in 2004
      (Millions of workers)
Net Hires 2
Hires 50
Total Separations 48
   Layoffs and Discharges 18
   Quits 26
   Other Separations 3
   Memo:
Labor Force 147
Private Sector Jobs 112
      Source: BLS, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS)
      Note: ‘Other separations’ include retirements and transfers to other locations.
Table 3.  Estimates for Service Jobs That Could Be Performed Offshore, as Percent of
Total U.S. Employment (Service and Non-service)
STUDY ESTIMATE
Bardhan and Kroll (2003) 11
Van Welsum and Reif (2005) 15
Jensen and Kletzer (2005) 23 a
Taking into account possible future automation that might increase offshorability:
Blinder (2006) 27 b
Notes: The estimates shown in the table assume government jobs are not offshorable. They do
not cover offshoring in manufacturing and are only for service offshoring, but the fractions are
expressed as a percent of all U.S. jobs — including jobs in manufacturing and other non-service
sectors. These estimates may differ from the estimates reported in the original studies, reflecting
some adjustments to make them more comparable. However, some differences still remain —
see the text for more detail. 
 A significant difference of Jensen and Kletzer’s estimate from the others is that it measuresa
tradability rather than offshorability. 
 That is the mid point of the range that Blinder reports as “two to three times manufacturing,”b
which corresponds to 21 to 32 percent of U.S. jobs.
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Table B-1.  Reasons for Separations in Mass Layoff Statistics in
2004
 Total MOW a
Total mass layoff initial claimants   1,464,164 
Separations lasting less than 31days  470,653 
"Extended" separations (lasting more than 31 days)  993,511 73,217
   
"Extended" but likely temporary, or reason not reported:  476,361 1,179
Seasonal work  334,380      -
Vacation period  17,612      -
Labor dispute  29,935      -
Material shortage  384      -
W eather-related  7,626      -
Plant or machine repair  2,811      -
Reason not reported  78,816      -
Model changeover  2,417      b
Not reported due to BLS disclosure standards  2,380      b
   
Extended Separations That Are Relatively Permanent  517,150 72,038
Bankruptcy  20,119      -
Business ownership change  30,376 3,805
Contract cancellation  18,398 1,362
Contract completed  170,192 621
Financial difficulty  43,220 6,517
Import competition  8,064 3,149
Product line discontinued  7,143 1,766
Reorganization within company  105,482 39,700
Slack work  76,643 3,476
 
 Other     37,513 11,642
Notes:
a. MOW  = Movement of work.
b. Does not meet BLS disclosure standards
Dash represents zero.
Source: Brown and Siegel (2005). (The grouping of
the reasons as “temporary” and “relatively
pemanent” is by this paper.)
-57-
Table B-2.  Mass Layoff Statistics Data and Offshoring in 2004 
 
       Total Share
Extended Separations That Are Relatively Permanent  517,150 100.0
Involving MOW  72,038 13.9a
Involving MOW  abroad  22,249 4.3b
Due to import competition  8,064 1.6
Involving MOW  3,149 0.6
Not involving MOW  4,915 1.0
Involving MOW  abroad, or import competition 27,164 5.3
Notes:
a. MOW  = Movement of work.
b. Assumes that separations for which detailed information is not available have
the same rate of breakdown in terms of whether work moved abroad or
domestically.
Source: Brown and Siegel (2005) and author's computations
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Table C-1.    IT Employment ((thousands) Employment by years:
(Thousands of workers)
occ_code occ_title 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
11-3021 Computer and Information Systems Managers 281 283 267 265 258 267
15-1011 Computer and Information Scientists, Research 26 26 26 24 24 25
15-1021 Computer Programmers 529 531 502 457 403 412
15-1031 Computer Software Engineers, Applications 288 375 362 357 411 426
15-1032 Computer Software Engineers, Systems Software 209 265 262 255 293 318
15-1041 Computer Support Specialists 463 523 493 479 481 489
15-1051 Computer Systems Analysts 428 463 448 468 486 489
15-1061 Database Administrators 101 108 104 102 98 97
15-1071 Network and Computer Systems Administrators 205 234 228 233 245 259
15-1081 Network Systems and Data Communications Analysts 98 119 126 133 156 169
17-2061 Computer Hardware Engineers 60 64 68 67 70 75
49-2011 Computer, Automated Teller, and Office Machine
Repairers
130 142 144 135 143 141
43-9011 Computer Operators 199 186 178 173 150 141
43-9021 Data Entry Keyers 520 459 405 377 323 314
ALL OCCUPATIONS 133,501 136,901 136,940 136,482 137,734 139,248
IT Employment (Above occupations ex. data entry) 3,017 3,319 3,207 3,148 3,216 3,308
IT Employment (Above occupations ex. data entry
keyers and computer operators) 2,818 3,132 3,029 2,975 3,066 3,167
Source: Employment for detailed occupations are from the OES. Total employment numbers are from the household survey. 
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Table C-2.  Changes in IT Employemt and Wages
1999-2004 Change 2004 Level
Occupation Occupation Employment Wages Employment Wages
Code Title a b a b c
15-1081 Network Systems and Data Communications Analysts 72 71 2.6 169 $30.5
15-1032 Computer Software Engineers, Systems Software 52 109 4.4 318 $39.5
15-1031 Computer Software Engineers, Applications 48 138 3.3 426 $37.2
15-1071 Network and Computer Systems Administrators 27 55 4.2 259 $29.6
17-2061 Computer Hardware Engineers 24 14 4.6 75 $40.4
15-1051 Computer Systems Analysts 14 61 3.4 489 $32.9
49-2011 Computer, Automated Teller, and Office Machine Repairers 9 11 3.2 141 $17.6
15-1041 Computer Support Specialists 6 26 2.0 489 $21.0
15-1061 Database Administrators -4 -5 3.8 97 $30.5
11-3021 Computer and Information Systems Managers -5 -13 5.7 267 $47.2
15-1011 Computer and Information Scientists, Research -6 -2 5.6 25 $42.3
15-1021 Computer Programmers -22 -117 3.7 412 $31.7
43-9011 Computer Operators -29 -58 3.1 141 $15.8
43-9021 Data Entry Keyers -40 -207 3.0 314 $11.7
ALL OCCUPATIONS 4.3 5,747 3.3 139,248 $17.8
IT Employment (Above occupations excl. data entry) 9.7 291 3,167
IT Employment (Above occupations excl. data entry
keyers and computer operators) 12.4 349 3,167
Source: All the wage data are from the OES, except for the wage change figure for "all occupations",  
which is based on the change in ECI, Private W ages and Salaries (g:JECIW SP).
a. Percentage change,  b. Thousands,  c. Dollar per hour.
